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EXCLUSIVITY OF APPRAISAL - THE
POSSIBILITY OF EXTINGUISHING
SHAREHOLDER CLAIMS
The author compares the Ohio and Delaware responses to
shareholder actions challenging conduct triggering the appraisal
remedy provided dissenting shareholders by statute. She asserts
that the appraisal remedy should not be shareholders' exclusive
form of relief in all cases where the remedy may be triggered. She
offers the Delaware courts' approach to exclusivity in support of
her proposition, and she criticizes the Ohio law on exclusivity of
appraisal by comparison.
INTRODUCTION
Because corporations are shifting capital structures, investors
are given various means of avoiding the impact of proposed chang-
es. States have enacted statutes granting stockholders a right to
appraisal of their stock upon their dissent from certain decisions of
directors, even when a majority of the shareholders vote to approve
the decision.' Exclusivity of appraisal occurs when a court refuses
1. See 12b WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS § 5906.2 (penn. ed. rev. vol. 1990) (discussing those changes which enable dissent-
ing shareholders to employ the appraisal remedy); Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann., § 13.02
(1984) (listing corporate changes which trigger the appraisal process) [hereinafter MBCA
Ann.]. See generally William J. Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Share-
holders, and Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 69 (disciissing the change
from requiring unanimous shareholder consent to majority consent in fundamental decisions
and the effect that change has on the efficiency of the corporation and wealth maximiza-
tion); Norman D. Lattin, Minority and Dissenting Shareholders' Rights in Fundamental
Changes, 23 LAw & CONTEmp. PROBs. 307 (1958) (discussing the development of funda-
mental changes in corporations and their effect on shareholders, as well as appraisal reme-
dies when shareholder contractual rights are usurped). For a listing of changes that trigger
appraisal in each state, see Joel Seligman, Reappraising the Apprihisal Remedy, 52 GEO,
WASH. L. REv. 829, 831-33 (1984) (listing such corporate activity as the decision to
merge or consolidate, sell all or substantially all corporate assets, sell corporate stock or
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to entertain a claim challenging the appraisal-triggering decision,
even though, had appraisal not been triggered, the claim could
have been pursued in a court-originated action.2 In other words, if
exclusivity is applied, challenges to director decisionmaking in the
appraisal-triggering event cannot be pursued in what would be a
collateral judicial action. The only remedy available to a dissenting
stockholder is the valuation and buy-out of his corporate shares.
As a result of exclusivity of the appraisal process, a court may
extinguish certain shareholder claims. For example, exclusivity may
effectively extinguish shareholder claims alleging that director mis-
conduct prior to the appraisal-triggering event resulted in the shares
being devalued. This effect results if a court, because of the avail-
ability of appraisal, (1) refuses to entertain a claim based on direc-
tor conduct other than the decision to engage in the appraisal-trig-
gering event on particular terms, or (2) limits its inquiry in the
process to finding the value of shares at the time of the appraisal-
triggering event. If a court applies exclusivity in this way, claims
amend the charter which results in the loss of accrued dividends); Allan W. Vestal, The
Rights of Dissenting Shareholders: Protecting the Owners Manning Forgot, 37 KAN. L.
REV. 349 (1989) (critiquing three articles which argue that shareholders are in no need of
dissenters' rights statutes).
2. For examples of sources discussing exclusivity of the appraisal process, see MBCA
Ann. § 13.02 (1985); see generally FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.3 (discussing statuto-
ry appraisal as an exclusive remedy); Joseph M. Coleman, The Appraisal Remedy in Cor-
porate Freeze-outs: Questions of Valuation and Exclusivity, 38 Sw. L.J. 775 (1984) (argu-
ing that the exclusivity of appraisal remedy is an obstacle to insuring that minority share-
holders receive their fair share when a corporation merges and exploring alternatives to
appraisal); Robert L. Dunn, Steinberg v. Amplica: The California Supreme Court Holds
Appraisal to be the Dissenting Shareholder's Exclusive Remedy, 22 U. S.F.L. REV. 293
(1988) (discussing the effect of Steinberg v. Amplica which held that a stockholder claim-
ing fraud and breach in connection with a merger can only resort to appraisal as a reme-
dy); Daniel R. Fischel, The Appraisal Remedy in Corporate Law, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 875 (arguing that appraisal should be the exclusive remedy available to sharehold-
ers); Heideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate
Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429 (1985) (discussing availability of appraisal and whether ac-
cess should affect availability of other legal remedies); Seligman, supra note 1 (proposing
a federal proceeding to partially or fully replace the state appraisal remedy); James
Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HARv. L.
REV. 1189 (1964) (discussing whether exclusivity allows the majority to forcibly acquire
the interest of an unwanted minority stockholder and whether minority stockholders may
seek judicial review of the proposed majority action); David Cohen, Comment, Valuation
in the Context of Share Appraisal, 34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985) (critiquing the Delaware
Supreme Court case Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. which called for a review [and replacement]
of outdated valuation techniques); see also Elliot J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-
Out Mergers: The Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1983)
(analyzing Weinberger v. UOP).
[Vol. 42:955
EXCLUSIVI7Y OF APPRAISAL
will be extinguished even though the cash requested as damages in
collateral actions is not a function of an alleged misvaluation deci-
sion by directors in setting the terms of the appraisal-triggering
event, but rather compensation for the directors' separate,
preappraisal misconduct. Moreover, the shareholder actions are lost
notwithstanding the fact the court would have entertained the claim
but for the fortuity of an intervening appraisal-triggering event.3
This note examines conditions necessary to invoke "exclusivi-
ty" of the appraisal process in Ohio and Delaware in light of re-
cent case law in both. states. Part I of this note briefly sets forth
the historical background of the appraisal proceeding.4 Part II ana-
lyzes current Delaware case law and formulates a rule regarding
exclusivity of appraisal.' Part III analyzes Ohio law in light of the
recent case Stepak v. Schey,6 and Part IV compares Ohio's ap-
proach to exclusivity with that followed in Delaware.7 The note
highlights both the ways in which Stepak retains similarities to
Delaware law and the significant way in which it differs from
Delaware, especially when a plaintiff seeks cash in excess of the
appraised share value. This note argues that, unlike Ohio law,
Delaware's approach appropriately balances the rights of both the
minority shareholders and the corporation. Furthermore, Delaware's
approach does not destroy shareholders' remedies for redress of a
preappraisal loss of share value caused by director misconduct
separate from setting the terms of the appraisal-triggering event.
I. APPRAISAL REMEDY
A. Historical Background
The appraisal remedy developed as a result of changes in the
common law rights of corporate shareholders. Historically, effecting
certain changes in a corporation, such as consolidations, mergers,
substantial transfers of assets and certain amendments to corporate
charters, required unanimous consent.8 Shareholders who disagreed
3. For examples of separate value-reducing misconduct, see infra text accompanying
notes 61-63.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 8-65.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 66-132.
6. 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990). See infra text accompanying notes 133-76.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 177-209.
8. Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 781-82 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1076 (1991); FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1 at 342; Michael G. Schinner,
Dissenting Shareholder's Statutory Right to Fair Cash Value: Armstrong v. Marathon Oil
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with such changes could rely upon courts of equity to enjoin these
corporate decisions.9 Courts upheld the unanimity requirement be-
cause they viewed each stockholder as having a vested property
right in the corporation, entitling him or her to determine what
changes should occur in the corporation."0  Shareholders were also
thought to need protection from a corporation's directors and from
the other shareholders if there were a vote on the appraisal-trigger-
ing event." Despite its benefits, unanimous consent proved too re-
strictive of corporations' ability to respond to economic and com-
mercial growth 2 because it enabled a "minority [shareholder] to
establish a nuisance value for its shares by refus[ing] to cooper-
ate." '3 A single shareholder could effectively block transactions
that were beneficial to both the corporation and the shareholders.' 4
In an attempt to balance the competing interests of sharehold-
ers, courts created exceptions to the unanimity requirement 5 and
Co., 22 AKRON L. REv. 261, 265 (1989) (discussing. the impact of Armstrong on Ohio
shareholders). See also authorities cited supra note 1.
9. Cohen, supra note 1, at 119.
10. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 781; see Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R. Co., 30 Pa.
42 (1858) (equity holding that without unanimous consent, merger of two railroads func-
tions as an act of dissolution and any dissenting shareholder must receive security for his
interest); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank
Coker, 72 Yale L.J. 223, 226-27, (1962) (discussing the traditional notions of stock own-
ership). More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court revisited the vested rights theory. See
Singer v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977-78 (Del. 1977) (holding that a shareholder
has rights not only in the value of his investment, but also in its form, and that without
a valid business purpose, a merger is invalid); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,
715 (Del. 1983) (overruling the business purpose test requirement and returning to the
principles of Stauffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962) and David J.
Greene & Co. v. Schenley Ind., 281 A.2d. 30, 36 (Del. 1971), which did not inquire into
whether directors had a valid business purpose for entering into a transaction).
11. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1 n.1, at 343 (discussing the need
to protect shareholders from "victimization by the majority"); Schinner, supra note 8;
Vestal, supra note 1, at 357-59 (discussing the traditional rationale for dissenting
shareholders' rights as protection from the majority).
12. See Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 782 (citing in particular the expansion in the late
nineteenth century as resulting in a need for larger financial structure).
13. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1, at 343 n.1; see also Schinner, supra note 8, at
265 (minority shareholders had the ability to exercise a "tyrannical" hold on the corpora-
tion).
14. See J. Steven Rogers, Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy, 30
OKLA. L. REV. 629, 629-31 (1977) ("To allow the decision of a single stockholder to
impede the making of such decisions would not only have an adverse effect on the vitali-
ty of the corporation, but would in effect negate the rights of the majority to exercise
control of the majority to exercise control over corporate affairs to which their ownership
of shares entitles them." Id. at 630.).
15. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 119-20 (discussing exceptions such as cash sales of
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allowed shareholders to dissent from the corporate change and
recover the cash value of their shares.'" States eventually passed
statutes that allowed corporations to undergo fundamental changes
in structure with less than a unanimous shareholder vote. 7 Con-
currently, states enacted statutes allowing minority shareholders to
receive the cash value of their shares through an appraisal proceed-
ing.'8 This change was intended to protect dissenting shareholders
from being forced (1) to accept consideration based on a valuation
they believed the directors and, if a vote were held, the majority
shareholders had incorrectly placed upon their shares, or (2) to
invest in an enterprise different from that they had intended to
invest in whether or not the stock had been properly valued. 9
Protection from the sdcond situation is important only if the
investor's needs could not be met by divestment from the present
firm and reinvestment in another firm in the market.2" This latter
concern does not arise when the appraisal-triggering event requires
shareholders to sever their investment in the firm in exchange for
cash, which is the kind of appraisal-triggering event upon which
this note focuses. In this subset of cases where cash replaces the
investment, the appraisal remedy is only one method by which
dissenting shareholders may express their right to disagree about
the valuation put upon their shares in setting the terms of the
appraisal-triggering event.
assets where no profit was expected and sales of assets for the stock of other corpora-
tions). See generally Carney, supra note 1, at 86-94 (discussing the judicial change result-
ing in the exceptions).
16. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 782; Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R. Co., 30 Pa. 42
(1858) (court granted injunction of merger until dissenting shareholders received security
for their stock).
17. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 782; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1, at 342; Rogers,
supra note 14, at 630.
18. FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1, at 342. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 2
(discusses the statutory appraisal remedy adopted by all states at time of the article except
West Virginia). But see Kanda & Lcvmore, supra note 2, at 430-31 (discussing whether
the connection between dissolution of the unanimity requirement and adoption of the
appraisal remedy is as contemporaneous as has been traditionally implied).
19. FI.ETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1, at 342-43. But cf. Fischel, supra note 2, at 878
(analyzing whether protection from a change in the character of a shareholder's investment
is a legitimate concern).
20. Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm Detriment,
and the Agent's Performance Obligation, 13 Canada-U.S. L.J. 155, 182 (1988). For a
more in-depth discussion of when investors need protection from management decisions
that have no impact on the market value of the investment, see id. at 180-83.
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B. The Appraisal Process
The appraisal remedy requires the corporation to buy the dis-
senting shareholders' stock at the appraised price.
2
' "Value," 22
"fair value,"23 and "fair cash value" 24 are terms commonly used
to describe the cash value paid to a dissenter for his stock.25 Stat-
utes differ as to what types of corporate changes trigger the ap-
praisal process.26 Once triggered, the procedure for the appraisal
process for dissenting shareholders is set forth in detail by state
statute." The stockholder must follow statutorily-prescribed
guidelines or risk losing the appraisal process as a remedy.28
1. Valuation
While statutes detail the appraisal proceedings and provide for
either the court or the parties to appoint appraisers,29 the statutes
generally do not set forth in the same detail the method for valu-
ing the dissenting shareholders' stock.30 Many states define the
value of dissenter's stock as "market value,"' 3t a term often re-
garded as synonymous with 'stock market value' when the stock is
traded on a national securities exchange. 32 Other jurisdictions have
21. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 782; FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.1, at 343; Melvin
A. Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis 69 (1976).
22. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262(0 (1983).
23. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.247(3) (1977); MBCA Ann. § 13.01.
24. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(5) (Baldwin 1990).
25. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 783; Manning, supra note 10, at 231. Although different
terms are used to describe the amount received by the dissenter for his shares, the argu-
ment has been made that the distinctions are meaningless, as they are used to indicate the
same worth. Warren v. Baltimore Transit Co., 154 A.2d 796, 799 (Md. 1959); Norman D.
Lattin, Remedies of Dissenting Shareholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 45 Harv. L. Rev.
233, 259 (1931).
26. See supra note 1.
27. Vestal, supra note 11, at 354-57. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.85(5)(B).
28. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.7 (listing general procedures necessary for
pursuing the appraisal process).
29. See generally id. at § 5906.8 (discussing methods of appointing appraisers adopted
by various states).
30. See generally Prentice-Hall, Corporations, § 2724 (1991) (discussing various meth-
ods of valuing dissenters' shares in the appraisal proceeding); Lattin, supra note 25, at
258-70 (describing the historical basis of share valuation through appraisal).
31. See Lattin, supra note 25, at 258 (dividing statutes into three categories based on
their interpretation of value).
32. In addition to stock market value as a means of valuing a dissenting stockholders'
shares, many state statutes provide for an exception to the appraisal process when the
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adopted a more flexible version of the stock market value, the
"willing buyer, willing seller" test.33 This test still puts significant
emphasis on the stock market value of the stock, but allows for
adjustment of the market value or construction of a hypothetical
market when valuing closely-held stock or stock which is not ac-
tively traded.' Another common method of valuation is the "Del-
aware block approach" in which the court weighs net asset value,
net earnings value and market value, and assigns percentage
weights to each in determining share value.35 The "Delaware
block approach" was the exclusive test used in Delaware prior to
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.36 Although not overruled, the Delaware
Supreme Court held in Weinberger that the "Delaware block
method" will no longer exclude other methods of valuation accept-
ed by the financial community.37
2. Breadth of the Appraisal Inquiry
The breadth of the inquiry in the appraisal proceeding varies
among the states. In Ohio and Delaware, the inquiry is quite nar-
row. For example, Armstrong v. Marathon Oil, Inc.31 construed
the Ohio appraisal statute, Revised Code section 1701.85(c), as it
stock is listed on a stock exchange or otherwise substantially traded. See Seligman, supra
note 17, at 834 (listing the states which recognize the stock market exception to the
appraisal process). The stock market exception has been widely criticized as not providing
shareholders with adequate valuation of their shares. See MBCA Ann., § 13.02 at 1368-69
(discussing its elimination of the stock market exception); Eisenberg, supra note 21, at
80-82 (arguing that the stock market is not likely to protect the stockholder who owns a
large block of shares). Cf. Fischel, supra note 2, at 884-85 (discussing various criticisms
of the stock market exception).
33. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.85(c) (defining the fair cash value of a
share as the amount a willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, would be willing to
accept, and a willing buyer, under no compulsion to purchase, would be willing to pay).
This test is often referred to as the 'hypothetical market test'. See generally Armstrong,
513 N.E.2d at 783-89 (discussing various methods of valuation).
34. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 788-89.
35. Diedre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Reappraising the Role of the Shareholder in
the Modern Public Corporation: Weinberger's Procedural Approach to Fairness on
Freezeouts, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 593, 610-12. This method has been criticized in recent
years. See Manning, supra note 10, at 232; Schinner, supra note 8, at 267-68; Note,
Minority Shareholders and Cashout Mergers: The Delaware Supreme Court Offers Plain-
tiffs Greater Protection and a Procedural Dilemma, - Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), 59 WASH L. REV. 119, 123 (1983).
36. 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983).
37. Id. at 712-13 (stating that "all relevant factors" will be considered when determin-
ing the value of a dissenter's stock).
38. 513 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1076 (1991).
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relates to compensation payable to dissenting shareholders.39 The
court found that the statute requires "payment of the fair cash
value to a shareholder for his shares as of the day prior to the vote
of the shareholders." 40 The statute further requires that any subse-
quent appreciation or depreciation in share value be excluded.41
The court held that in the case of a corporation whose stock is
sufficiently traded, the stock market price is the correct price to
determine value.42 In the case of a closely-held corporation whose
stock is infrequently traded, the court should apply a hypothetical
market valuation to determine value.43 Indeed, the court noted the
narrowness of such an inquiry by stating that "the scope of anal-
ysis is fairly narrowed such that the parties may ...predict the
outcome of the proceedings."'  The court noted that "the legisla-
ture has evidenced a specific intent to narrow price considerations
to those pertinent to the willing buyer-willing seller standard."
45
Delaware case law has also indicated the narrowness of the
appraisal inquiry. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. 4 6 established the exclu-
sivity of appraisal in Delaware for dissenting shareholders when
determining the value of their shares,47 but the holding must be
viewed in light of later cases. For example, In re Shoe-Town, Inc.
Stockholders Litigation4' explained the impact of Rabkin v. Philip
A. Hunt Chemical Corp.49 and Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc."0
in clarifying the Weinberger holding. "[A]ppraisal is often inade-
quate where a complaint alleges unfair dealing that if true affects
the price being challenged .... [B]reaches of the duties of loyalty
and care, raise issues which an appraisal cannot address."5' In-
deed, the Cede court found that in an "appraisal action the only
39. Id. at 781.
40. Id. at 784.
41. Id. at 788.
42. Id. at 787 (basing this conclusion upon a determination that stock exchange prices
are nearly identical to the actual value due to an active market for the stock).
43. Id. at 789.
44. Id. at 788. A narrow inquiry would foster pre-appraisal settlement and decrease the
costs to all shareholders.
45. Id. at 798.
46. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
47. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Weinberger approach
to exclusivity of appraisal).
48. No. 9483 Consolidated, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, at *11-12 (Feb. 12, 1990).
49. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
50. 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988).
51. In re Shoe-Town, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14 at *12.
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litigable issue is the determination of the value of the appraisal
petitioners' shares on the date of the merger... and the only
relief available is a judgment against the surviving corporation for
the fair value of the [dissenting shareholders'] shares. 52
Thus, it is evident that the limited inquiry in appraisal cannot
address the merits of claims based on conduct that has caused a
pre-appraisal decrease in share value. If the appraisal process could
be expanded to take into account the value of claims, based on
conduct other than the misvaluation of shares that has reduced their
value, then the availability of appraisal would be. more useful.53
The problem of extinguishment would not exist if those claims
could be heard in an appraisal proceeding and any amount accord-
ed the shareholders tacked onto the value of shares reckoned as of
the appraisal date. However, without such an expansion, appraisal
only provides a forum for adjudication of the value of shares due
to director's misvaluation conduct.
3. Exclusivity
State statutes differ in their express statements regarding the
exclusivity of the appraisal remedy.54 Some state statutes are si-
lent on whether the appraisal remedy is exclusive." In such a
case, the judiciary ordinarily provides that appraisal is exclusive
only if certain conditions have been met.56 Other states provide
statutorily that even in cases where the claim is based upon
misvaluation of shares by the directors, the appraisal remedy is not
exclusive if fraud or illegality is involved.5 The underlying theo-
52. Cede, 542 A.2d at 1187. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1143 (Del.
1989) also establishes the insufficiency of the appraisal process for remedying any claims,
corporate or direct, based on alleged director misconduct other than improperly determin-
ing the value of shares. It stated that the plaintiffs claim -relate[d] directly to the fair
value of his stock, not to the validity of the merger itself." Id.
53. See, e.g., Walter J. Schloss Associates v. Arkwin Ind., 460 N.E.2d 1090, 1091
(N.Y. 1984) (suggesting the possibility of opening up the appraisal inquiry).
54. See generally MBCA Ann. §13.02 at 1373-74, 1374.2-1379; Prentice-Hall, supra
note 30, at §2724 (setting forth the positions of several states regarding exclusivity of the
appraisal process); Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1189 (arguing that appraisal is not a mi-
nority shareholder's exclusive remedy).
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(0; OHIO REV. CODE ANN., § 1701.85.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 81-119.
57. See, e.g., Rosenstein v. CMC Real Estate Corp. 522 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Il. App. CL
1988) (holding that absent allegations of fraud or other illegality, statutory appraisal provi-
sions of Wisconsin business corporation law provided shareholders with exclusive remedy);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW, § 623(k) (McKinney 1986); MBCA Ann. §13.02(b); see also
FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 5906.3, at 354 (identifying states which recognize an exception
1992]
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ry accepts the principle of exclusivity, but does not accept that a
corporation should be permitted to proceed unlawfully or fraudu-
lently because of its ability to "pay off" the dissenting shareholder
through the appraisal proceeding or through the terms of the
transaction."8 Finally, some statutes expressly state that appraisal
is an exclusive remedy, without providing exceptions.59 The judi-
ciary in these states have refused to recognize exceptions to the
statutes.6° When a state provides a dissenting shareholder with the
exclusive remedy of appraisal, either by statute or judicial construc-
tion, extinguishment of the shareholder's various other claims may
occur regardless of the time and circumstances at the claims' ori-
gin.
Exclusivity is particularly dangerous where appraisal ineffec-
tively accounts for the devaluation of shares. As the discussion of
valuation has shown, the appraisal process is designed to assign a
value to dissenters' shares. However, it only provides the dissenter
with a method of avoiding the impact of a director decision that,
in setting the terms of the appraisal-triggering transaction, assigns a
value to shares below that which they are actually worth at the
time of appraisal. Other share-value-reducing harms allegedly oc-
curring through the directors' separate misconduct, reflected in
share value at appraisal time, will not be taken into account.
One such example of separate misconduct occurs when the
value of firm assets are affected prior to a decision of what the
to the exclusivity of the appraisal process in cases involving fraudulent transactions); see
generally Coleman, supra note 2, at 794 (analogizing the effect as -lower[ing] the status
of a minority shareholder to that of a holder of a note prepayable at the will of the lend-
er').
58. MBCA Ann., § 13.02 at 1366; see also Kahn v. Columbus Mills, Inc., 371 S.E.2d
908, 910 (Ga. App. 1988) (allowing shareholders to pursue a proceeding collateral to
appraisal even though they had accepted payment for their stock).
59. See, e.g., CALIF. CORP. CODE, § 3012 (West 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
33-373(f) (1987); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 15, § 1515(k) (Purdon 1987).
60. See Steinberg v. Amplica, Inc., 729 P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986) (holding that despite the
plaintiff's claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, appraisal was the shareholder's
exclusive remedy); see also Yanow v. Teal Indus., 422 A.2d 311 (Conn. 1979) (holding
that CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 33-373 to -374 entitle a dissenting shareholder only to pay-
ment for the value of his shares under the statutory appraisal proceeding); In re Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 412 A.2d 1099, 1104 (Pa. 1980) (finding the shareholders* remedy
limited to the appraisal process but "not condon[ing] the manner in which the appellants
and other minority shareholders were deprived of their equitable interest in [the corpora-
tion]"). But see Schloss Assocs. v. C & 0 Ry., 536 A.2d 147, 153 (Md. App. CL 1988)




assets are worth. In this instance, the value of the shares has been
adversely affected so that appraisal cannot account for devaluation
because appraisal sets the value after the harm has occurred. A
claim that excess compensation has been paid to officers through
golden parachute provisions illustrates such pre-appraisal miscon-
duct causing misvaluation.6 t A second example exists when a firm
is deprived of all the assets to which it is entitled because the
shares were issued for less than adequate consideration.62 Third,
even if the new shares are issued for adequate consideration, the
issuance may discourage bidding in a control share market and re-
gardless of any effects on the value of firm assets, cause a reduc-
tion in share value by influencing the supply-demand features of
the share market.
All three examples describe settings where the value of shares
is diminished by director conduct other than determining share
value when setting the terms of an appraisal-triggering event. The
first two examples show how shares can be devalued by
decisionmaking that affects the value of firm assets. Claims based
on such conduct often, though not always, must be pursued as
corporate claims either derivatively or nonderivatively.63 In the
third example, the allegation is that share value has been reduced
independently of effects on the value of firm assets; such a claim
would be direct, leading to personal recovery by shareholders.' In
all three cases, the relief sought may be cash in the amount of the
share value reduction. However, such cash relief represents not
61. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 154-56. Cf. Fisher v. Steelville Community
Banc-Shares, Inc., 713 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Mo. App. 1986) (stating that "allegations that a
majority shareholder, who controlled the corporate directors, caused dividends to be with-
held and depressed the value of the stock of a minority shareholder for the purpose of
acquiring that stock state a cause of action" for misconduct which decreased the value of
the shares before the merger).
62. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 147-51.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 120-32 (discussing why claims that are corporate
will never be subject to exclusivity in Delaware); see also infra text accompanying notes
188-205 (discussing whether extinguishment might be acceptable with respect to claims
that are normally corporate).
64. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985) (noting that (1) the
grant of an option had foreclosed the bidding market and (2) only one subsequent offer
was received and this resulted from officers' efforts to solicit the negotiations). Cf. Lipton
v. News Int'l, PLC, 514 A.2d 1075 (Del. 1986) (finding a claim that issuance to a third
party of 19% of the company's stock interfered with the plaintiff's voting rights was a
direct claim); Williams v. Geier, Civ. No. 8456, (Del. Ch. May 20, 1987) (LEXIS, States
library, Del. file) (finding that (1) a plan relating to a recapitalization did not limit the
transferability of household shares, but rather impacted prospective purchasers and (2) such
a claim was a direct claim).
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merely the loss from directors' failure to give sufficient value to
shares, but the diminution in value due to wrongdoing other than
misvaluation of shares.
These three examples of share devaluation caused by events
prior to appraisal of the shares are not likely to be redressed in
appraisal. This lapse results because statutes fail to describe ap-
praisal in a way that permits trial of the merits of claims that
directors' conduct, other than misvaluation of the shares them-
selves, caused the shares to decrease in value by the time the
valuation decision was made.65 Thus, unless shareholders can pur-
sue these claims in actions collateral to appraisal, the claims are in
danger of extinguishment.
II. EXCLUSIVITY OF THE APPRAISAL PROCESS
IN DELAWARE
A. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc.,6 forming the basis for the current law on appraisal in
Delaware. In Weinberger, the plaintiff brought a class action suit67
challenging the elimination of UOP's minority shareholders follow-
ing a cash-out merger between UOP and Signal Companies, Inc.,
its majority shareholder.68 The plaintiff sought to rescind the
merger or, in the alternative, to receive rescissionary damages in
the form of money or stock in the surviving corporation.69 Origi-
nally, Signal invested its excess cash by purchasing 50.5% of
UOP's stock, but later expressed an interest in obtaining the re-
mainder of UOP's shares.7" Two Signal executives, who also
served as Signal board members and directors of UOP, prepared a
feasibility study regarding a merger of UOP into Signal. The report
stated that a price up to $24 a share would be a good investment
65. See supra notes 38-53 and accompanying text (discussing the narrowness of the
appraisal inquiry).
66. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
67. A class action suit is merely a collection of direct claims. For a discussion of the
distinction between corporate and direct claims, see infra notes 120-32 and accompanying
teXL
68. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703.
69. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
70. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 704-05.
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for Signal.7' UOP retained Lehman Brothers to give a fairness
opinion regarding an offer by Signal of $20-$21 per share for UOP
stock.72 The proposed merger was approved at $21 per share by
the outside directors of UOP, but no disclosure regarding the feasi-
bility study was ever made to non-Signal directors or UOP share-
holders.73
The court held that in a cash-out merger,74 the appraisal rem-
edy is exclusive with respect to claims by dissenting shareholders
when the only allegation is that the directors have failed to appro-
priately determine the cash value of the shares.75 The court stated
that it was returning to the principles of David J. Greene & Co. v.
Schenley Industries, Inc.76 and Stauffer v. Standard Brands,
Inc.,77 cases holding that appraisal is exclusive when the "real re-
lief sought is the recovery of the monetary value of [the] plaintiff's
shares . . . [and] [t]he dispute reduces to nothing but a difference
of opinion as to value. '7' This principle alone rules out exclusivi-
ty with respect to claims based on director decisionmaking that has
already resulted in a Aiminution of share value when the time
arrives for determining value under the appraisal mechanism. The
court also expanded the category of claims not subject to exclusivi-
ty by holding that the appraisal remedy is not adequate in actions
challenging directors' share valuation decisions "where fraud, mis-
representation, self-dealing, deliberate waste of corporate assets, or
gross and palpable overreaching are involved. 79
By the court's language, its holding would not extend to
claims based on conduct other than the board's failure to arrive at
a proper valuation of its stock in a cash-out dissent-triggering
event. Moreover, the court said nothing to imply that the avail-
71. Id. at 705.
72. Id. at 706.
73. Id. at 707-09.
74. See generally Elliott J. Weiss, Balancing Interests in Cash-Out Mergers: The
Promise of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 8-25 (1983) (discussing the
history of cash-out mergers).
75. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. For a list of transactions triggering appraisal, see
DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, §§ 251, 252, 254, 257, 258.
76. 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
77. 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
78. Id. at 80.
79. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Accord Rosenstein v. CMC Real Estate Corp., 522
N.E.2d 221, 225 (I11. App. 1988) (holding appraisal under Wisconsin law exclusive absent
fraud or other illegality occurring prior to the merger); Sifferle v. Micom Corp., 384
N.W.2d 503, 509 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that appraisal is a shareholder's exclu-
sive remedy unless the merger is fraudulent).
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ability of dissenter's rights would affect claims, for money or oth-
erwise, based on other prior or simultaneous director conduct.
Hence, Weinberger said nothing about judicial recourse for director
behavior that may have caused a decrease in share value prior to
the appraisal. Such a conclusion follows because the appraisalpro-
cess is not statutorily described in such a way as to permit valua-
tion when director misconduct devalued shares prior or simulta-
neous to the appraisal triggering event.8"
Subsequent case history has further refined and explained the
conditions under which appraisal is the exclusive remedy in a cash-
out merger. Absent these conditions, the claim will not be subject
to exclusivity. The post-Weinberger cases develop the conditions of
exclusivity by classifying cases on the basis of the different types
of decisionmaking being challenged and the format (corporate or
direct) for redressing the alleged harm.
B. Conditions Necessary to Invoke Exclusivity
Several conditions concerning decisionmaking that triggers
appraisal must be met in order for appraisal to be a dissenting
shareholder's exclusive remedy. First, Weinberger held that the
appraisal-triggering event must be an all cash freeze-out." Later
Chancery court decisions, however, have expanded the scope of
exclusivity of appraisal to include transactions involving payments
of part cash and part securities. For example, in Porter v. Texas
Commerce Bancshares, Inc.,82 the plaintiffs challenged a merger
in which the shareholders were to receive both cash and securities
in exchange for their stock. The court stated that most of the
plaintiffs' complaint was based on inadequacy of the merger price,
a claim for which appraisal was their exclusive remedy. Despite
the focus of the plaintiffs' case, the court did not relegate the
claim to appraisal, because the plaintiffs established a nondisclosure
claim. 3 One concern raised by Porter is the possibility that courts
will allow exclusivity of appraisal where the appraisal-triggering
event calls solely for the receipt of securities. Because no identified
cash value for securities exists and appraisal only provides for a
80. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53 (discussing the narrowness of the ap-
praisal inquiry).
81. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714.
82. Civ. No. 9114, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 130 (Oct. 12, 1989).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 94-96 (discussing the nondisclosure claim).
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cash remedy, it is questionable whether the valuation procedure
provided by appraisal would prove adequate in a case involving
securities alone. As a result of recent decisions such as Porter, it is
no longer clear that appraisal-triggering terms must call for receipt
of all cash in order to subject the shareholder's claim exclusively
to appraisal.
A second condition of exclusivity requires that a shareholder's
claim asserted collaterally to appraisal allege only that the directors
inaccurately valued the shares that are to receive cash; the claim
must not challenge other director decisionmaking. A claim chal-
lenging wrongful behavior other than incorrect share valuation
would not be subject to appraisal according to the appraisal statute
itself." The appraisal statute sets forth the procedure by which a
dissenting shareholder can adjudicate the value of his shares. If
valuation of these shares is not at issue, then the availability of the
appraisal process is of little significance.
However, certain exceptions to this second condition are rec-
ognized. Even if the shareholder's claim is limited to a challenge
of director decisionmaking related to valuation of his shares, the
collateral claim will not. be precluded by appraisal if such
decisionmaking was accompanied by (1) deception by the directors
or shareholders (if the shareholders had a choice to make), (2)
conflict of interest in decisionmaking by the directors or sharehold-
ers, or (3) waste. Illustrations of each exception follow.
In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.," plaintiffs who had orig-
inally dissented from a cash-out merger requested an appraisal pro-
ceeding to determine the value of their shares. They subsequently
brought a collateral judicial action against the directors for breach
of fiduciary duty, alleging fraud in connection with the vote to
approve the terms of the merger. 6 The action for fraud was con-
sidered a direct claim."7 In its ruling consolidating both actions
for discovery and trial purposes, the court discussed the difference
between the claims."8 The court stated that an appraisal proceed-
ing and a rescissory suit for fraud "serve different purposes and are
designed to provide different, and not interchangeable, reme-
84. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 262.
85. 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988).
86. Id. at 1185.
87. Id. at 1183.
88. Id. at 1187.
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dies." ' An appraisal proceeding is a legislative remedy which
provides the shareholder with the court's determination of the in-
trinsic value of the stock.90 In contrast, a remedy for fraud is
more expansive than a determination of fair value, allowing "what-
ever relief the facts of a particular case may require." 9' The court
reasoned that "appraisal is limited to the payment of fair value of
the shares, [and a] determination of fair value does not involve an
inquiry into claims of wrongdoing in the merger."'  To allow
fraud claims to be brought into the appraisal proceeding would
"impermissibly broaden the legislative remedy."93 Therefore, even
when a claim is based on a misvaluation by directors, the appraisal
proceeding is the incorrect forum in which to litigate the claim if
there were a basis for nondamage forms of relief.
Another example of deception which has been found sufficient
to establish a claim outside the appraisal proceeding is failure to
disclose material facts during the course of a merger. In Porter v.
Texas Commerce Bancshares,94 the plaintiff alleged that failure to
disclose the existence of a "when-issued" market and facts relating
to this market constituted a breach of a duty of candor by the
directors. 95 The court held that if the facts were true, they would
establish a claim that could not be adjudicated within the appraisal
proceeding.' Appraisal is a substitute for a shareholder taking the
cash specified by the terms of the cash-out transaction and recover-
ing the difference between the cash received and the true value of
the stock, but it does not provide for nondamage forms of relief or
for a determination of whether deception existed.
Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.9" illustrates the ex-
ception to exclusivity recognized in cases of misvaluation accompa-
nied by a conflict of interest. In Rabkin, a class action suit was
brought on behalf of the minority shareholders of Hunt challenging
the cash-out merger of Hunt with Olin Corporation, its majority
stockholder.98 Three directors had dual memberships on the boards
89. Id. at 1186.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1187.
92. Id. at 1189.
93. Id.
94. Civ. No. 9114, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 130 (Oct. 12, 1989).
95. Id. at *19-20.
96. Id. at *23-24.
97. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
98. Id. at 1100.
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of Hunt and Olin." These directors failed to disclose the ex-
istence and content of a memorandum prepared by an Olin officer
and given to the three Olin directors who were also on the board ;,
of Hunt."e The memorandum summarized the pros and cons of a
merger with Hunt and revealed Olin's intent to acquire the remain-
der of Hunt's stock."0' The court analogized the situation to that
in Weinberger and found that on the face of the complaint, the
three Olin directors' compliance with their "duty of loyalty to
Hunt!" '2 was questionable. The conduct of these directors implied
a form of domination over the remaining Hunt directors, and estab-
lished a potential conflict of interest claim. 3 The conflict of
interest meant the transaction did not occur through arms-length
negotiations, making nondamage forms of relief available and
heightening the level of scrutiny applied to the transaction."
The trial court, relying on Weinberger, granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the claims, reasoning that "absent claims of
fraud or deception a minority stockholder's rights in a cash-out
merger [are] limited to an appraisal."'0 5 The supreme court over-
turned the decision, finding the lower court's interpretation of
Weinberger too narrow and stating that "Weinberger's mandate of
fair dealing does not turn solely on issues of deception."" ° Rath-
er, the court identified "these are issues which an appraisal cannot
address . . . ." Thus, although the court found that the
directors' decision regarding valuation of the stock was the subject
of the challenge, it declined to limit the minority shareholders'
remedy only to appraisal because other issues, such as unfair deal-
ing, 0 could not be addressed by the appraisal proceeding." 9
99. Id. at 1101.
100. Id. at 1101-02.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1106.
103. Id.
104. Id. The special scrutiny applied to cases where directors have divided loyalties is
called the "entire fairness standard.- Id.
105. Id. at 1103.
106. Id. at 1104-05.
107. Id. at 1106.
108. Fair dealing was an issue in Rabkin because of the conflict of interest among the
directors. Id. at 1101.
109. Id. at 1106-07. See Seagraves v. Urdstadt Prop. Co., No. 10307, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 155, at *11 (Nov. 13, 1989) (holding that a claim of unfair dealing "if true,
would establish an actionable breach of fiduciary duty affecting the merger price that
could not be redressed in an appraisal"); In re Shoe-Town Inc. Stockholders Litig., No.
9483, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 14, *12 (Feb. 12, 1990) ("appraisal is often inadequate where
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Rabkin also illustrates that the presence of waste or overreach-
ing would not subject a claim challenging valuation misconduct to
exclusivity. The Rabkin plaintiffs sought to enjoin the proposed
merger between Hunt and Olin and enforce a contractual right to
receive $25 per share.11 The plaintiffs claimed that their contrac-
tual right was destroyed by Olin's purposeful timing of the merger
so that Olin would avoid a one-year commitment to pay a set price
of $25 for Hunt stock.' Viewing the Hunt directors' failure to
enforce the pre-existing contract as waste, the court noted that the
"plaintiffs [were] not arguing questions of valuation which [were]
the traditional subjects of an appraisal."" 2 In addition to estab-
lishing conflict of interest, therefore, the plaintiffs sufficiently al-
leged a claim of waste and were not relegated to appraisal as their
exclusive remedy." 3
Tte final condition necessary to invoke exclusivity is that the
plaintiff seek cash relief and not allege facts sufficient to warrant
nondamage relief. For example, in Norberg v. Young's Market
Co.," 4 shareholders sought in a class action to enjoin a cash-out
merger 1 5 and obtain an award of money damages."16 The plain-
tiff alleged no conflict of interest or waste, and the court held
moot a claim of non-disclosure because the defendants agreed to
make further disclosures." 7 Moreover, the court found that the
plaintiff failed to establish the two elements necessary to support
an order for injunctive relief.18 As a result, the court held that
damage relief was sufficient and that appraisal was the plaintiff's
exclusive remedy notwithstanding his plea for injunctive relief. 9
a complaint alleges unfair dealing that if true affects the price being challenged").
110. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1105.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. This language also implies that corporate claims are not subject to exclusivity
of appraisal. The traditional subjects regarding valuation in appraisal are those relating to
the amount of share value at the appraisal date, not to issues like corporate
decisionmaking which relate instead to how the shares got to be worth the amount at
which they are appraised.
113. Id. at 1107.
114. Civ. Nos. 11,208, 11,253, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 174 (Dec. 19, 1989).
115. Id. at *3.
116. Id. at *15.
117. Id. at *3.
118. Id. at *12-13. A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must prove that the plaintiff
would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction does not issue and that the harm to the
plaintiff would outweigh the harm to the defendants if injunctive relief is granted.
119. Id. at *16-17. The court noted that if inadequate disclosures had been at issue,
irreparable harm could have been established and the plaintiffs would not have been rele-
[Vol. 42:955
EXCLUSIVITY OF APPRAISAL
C. Corporate v. Direct Claims
The conditions necessary to invoke exclusivity of appraisal in
Delaware raise the implication that only direct claims can be sub-
ject to exclusivity. Thus, the claim format is often useful in deter-
mining broad categories of cases that are not subject to the Dela-
ware principles of exclusivity. A corporate claim may be brought
either nonderivatively by the directors or derivatively by the share-
holders, and is the form of action pursued when harm to investors
is best remedied by relief flowing to the corporation rather than to
individual investors.120  Conversely, direct claims are appropriate
where the nature of the harm requires that an award be made di-
rectly to the shareholder.'
gated to appraisal. Id. at *16 n.2. Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182
(Del. 1988) (holding that the dissenters could raise both appraisal and fraud actions as
alternative means of recovery); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099
(Del. 1985) (acknowledging the inadequacy of the appraisal remedy where defendants are
charged with bad faith and procedural unfairness but not with deception); Porter v. Texas
Commerce Bancshares, Civ. No. 9114, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 130 (Oct. 12, 1989) (hold-
ing that to the extent the complaint made allegations in addition to the inadequacy of the
merger price, relief otherwise unavailable in an appraisal action may be granted).
120. A corporate claim 'is further complicated by the fact that a stockholder pursuing
the claim derivatively is subject to a loss of standing to pursue the claim if the claim is
brought after a merger. For example, in Kramer v. Western Pacific Ind, 546 A.2d 348
(Del. 1988), the plaintiff alleged waste of corporate assets because of inappropriate stock
options and golden parachutes received by two of the company's directors. Id at 350.
The court characterized the claims as derivative corporate claims, pointing out that wheth-
er a claim is corporate -must be 'determined from the nature of the wrong alleged' and
the relief, if any, which could result if plaintiff were to prevail." Id. at 352-53 (citing
Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 100 A.2d 219, 221-23 (Del. Ch. 1953)). The court held
that because the plaintiff was no longer a shareholder and did not fit into one of the two
exceptions set forth in Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 n.10 (Del. 1984), he did
not have standing to pursue a claim on behalf of the corporation. Id. at 354-55. The two
Lewis exceptions are: "(i) if the merger itself is the subject of a claim of fraud, being
perpetrated merely to deprive shareholders of the standing to bring a derivative action; or
(ii) if the merger is in reality merely a reorganization which does not affect plaintiff's
ownership in the business enterprise." Id. at 354. Cf. Cede & Co. v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,751 (Del. Sept. 11, 1989). Although the standing
issue is a problem different from exclusivity, with respect to corporate claims, it might be
argued that loss of standing might render insignificant any concern about extinguishment
of claims by exclusivity. But see infra text accompanying notes 188-205.
121. See Kramer, 546 A.2d at 351-52 (discussing the nature of the distinctions between
corporate and direct claims). If returning relief directly to the shareholder circumvents the
directors' discretion over the corporation's asset pool and the limits on their discretion and
performance obligations, then the claim is properly pursued in the corporate claim format.
Circumstances may dictate however, that the recovery be returned directly to the share-
holder. For example, in the event a firm's asset pool has been diminished, if the rights of
other shareholders or creditors are adequately protected through means other than the
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Post-Weinberger cases maintain that claims characterized as
corporate claims, and which must be pursued as such, will not be
subject to the exclusivity of appraisal. That is, a Delaware court
should not refuse to entertain these claims on the basis that ap-
praisal is a plaintiff's only forum. With one exception, Cavalier
Oil Corp. v. Harnett,22 post-Weinberger decisions have held that
misconduct properly pursued in the corporate claim format cannot
be litigated in an appraisal proceeding, even though entitlement to
appraisal fortuitously happens to be triggered before the corporate
claim is tried.
In Cavalier Oil, a minority stockholder sought appraisal fol-
lowing his dissent from a cash-out merger. 23 Both the stockhold-
er, Harnett, and the corporation appealed the decision determining
the fair value of his shares. 24 The relevant issue was whether
Harnett could assert a seizure-of-corporate-opportunity claim, an
action which would normally be pursued as a corporate claim, in
the appraisal proceeding. 25 The court held that, because of the
unusual facts of the case, the corporate opportunity claim could be
considered in the appraisal proceeding, notwithstanding its previous
rulings that such claims "impermissibly expand[ed] the appraisal
remedy."126
Focusing on the prior consent of the parties allowing corporate
claims to be included in the appraisal proceeding, the court found
that the derivative-like claim in Cavalier Oil, unlike most deriva-
tive claims, could be satisfactorily redressed in the appraisal ac-
tion. 27 According to the court, "[t]he wrongdoing alleged by
Harnett relate[d] directly to the fair value of his stock, not to the
directors' discretion, then these circumstances should entitle a shareholder/plaintiff to direct
recovery. Additionally, if the firm's assets are being withdrawn at the time the assets are
being sold and payments for net assets are being made by the purchaser directly to share-
holders, no policy is served by requiring pursuit of a claim in the corporate format.
122. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
123. Id. at 1139.
124. See id. The Court of Chancery valued Harnett's stock at $347,000. The corporation
offered $93,950. Cavalier appealed and Harnett cross-appealed the court's decision. Id.
125. See id. at 1142 (the court held that Harnett's corporate opportunity claim was not
barred by res judicata).
126. Id. at 1143. Earlier rulings disallowed claims for breach of fiduciary duty, common
law fraud, unfair dealing, misrepresentation, self-dealing, waste of corporate assets and
gross overreaching. See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del.




validity of the merger itself."" 8 The court even indicated how the
potential corporate claim had become direct. In describing the harm
suffered by Harnett, the court stated that his claim was "viewed as
more personal than derivative... in view of his status as sole
minority shareholder whose claims of fraud are directed against the
two controlling shareholders."' 29 Therefore, although Cavalier Oil
allowed what was originally a corporate claim to be asserted in the
appraisal proceeding, it did so only because of the unusual facts of
that case. The court recognized that corporate claims cannot nor-
mally be brought within the appraisal proceeding and even direct
claims that are based on misconduct other than valuing shares
cannot be remedied through appraisal' t3
Thus, the, Delaware cases demonstrate that only direct claims
which also fulfill the conditions for challenges to decisionmaking
will be subject to exclusivity. No corporate claim would be subject
to exclusivity under Delaware standards because all corporate
claims are based on conduct other than alleged director
misvaluation of shares, and only claims based on alleged director
misvaluation are subject to exclusivity.' 3 ' Therefore, a claim is
subject to exclusivity of the appraisal process in Delaware only
when the claim is direct and the relief sought is monetary, and
then only when the challenged decision (1) relates to misvaluation
at the appraisal date and (2) is free of deception, conflict of inter-
est and waste. No other direct claims are subject to exclusivity.
Because Delaware exclusivity is limited to claims that are
based on director determination of share value for purposes of an
appraisal-triggering event and because such a claim would always
be direct, the corporate quality of a claim serves as a reliable
proxy for identifying one subset of claims that are not subject to
Delaware exclusivity. The direct quality of a claim cannot alone, of
course, be a proxy for application of exclusivity. Only a subset of
direct claims - those which challenge director determination of
consideration to be received in exchange for shares and are free
from deception, conflict of interest or waste - are subject to ex-
clusivity. All other direct claims survive. Moreover, claims that are
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 38-53.
131. For example, claims that shares have been issued for inadequate consideration or
that assets of a firm have been depleted prior to a valuation decision are claims based on
nonmisvaluation conduct. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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not subject to exclusivity may well pray for, cash relief, but that
factor makes them no less immune from exclusivity. It is- the type
of conduct upon which a claim is based that determines whether or
not exclusivity applies.
Exclusivity, if applied only to the narrow category of direct
claims defined by Delaware restrictions, makes appraisal merely a
"substitute" for a collateral judicial action for damages that could
have been based on a valuation decision by directors afforded the
business judgment rule.'32 However, if exclusivity is extended be-
yond the Delaware restrictions on the doctrine, the exclusivity of
appraisal extinguishes claims by cutting off collateral judicial pur-
suit of them without furnishing a substitute.
I. EXCLUSIVITY OF THE APPRAISAL PROCESS IN OHIO
A. Stepak v. Schey -- The Facts
In light of the recent case Stepak v. Schey,133 Ohio has taken
a far different approach to exclusivity of appraisal than Delaware.
Delaware has been careful not to cause claims based upon wrong-
ful conduct that may have diminished the value of shares prior to
appraisal to be extinguished by its application of the exclusivity of
the appraisal process. In contrast, Ohio has caused extinguishment
by failing to distinguish between claims on the basis of the deci-
sion being challenged (and, as a shortcut, their "corporate" or
"direct" nature).
In Stepak, the plaintiff (Stepak) brought an action against the
Scott & Fetzer Company, certain of its directors and Berkshire
Hathaway, Inc. (Berkshire), Scott & Fetzer's new sole
shareholder.t34 Stepak alleged three claims.'35  First, Stepak
claimed that Scott & Fetzer had granted a lock-up option to
Berkshire at an inadequate price with the intent to discourage other
132. See, e.g., In re Resorts Int'l Shareholders Litig. Appeals, 570 A.2d 259, 266-67
(Del. 1990) (confirming the trial court's findings that "the contested transactions . . . had
been approved by an independent and disinterested special committee and therefore would
be accorded the presumption of the business judgment rule's application[]" and that claims
of waste of corporate assets were unmerited).
133. 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990).
134. Id. at 1073.
135. Id. At the point in the proceedings where exclusivity is asserted, the court does
not render a decision based on sufficiency of the pleading of the merits of the claims.
Rather, only a superficial examination of pleadings is made to determine the nature of the
claims being alleged. Id. at 1074.
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bidder's attempts to acquire the company. 136 He alleged that the
option had the effect of placing a cap on the amount the share-
holders could realize for their shares.1 31 Second, Stepak asserted
that Scott & Fetzer directors inappropriately received benefits worth
$30,000,000 from a special compensation package attained through
unfair dealing and manipulation.1 38 Stepak alleged that this mon-
ey should have been paid to the shareholders as consideration for
the merger.139 Third, Stepak claimed that the directors breached
their fiduciary duties in structuring the transaction resulting in an
unfair distribution of the company's assets to the shareholders. The
shareholders therefore, were unable to obtain a fair price for their
stock." ° The plaintiff did not allege that a conflict of interest oc-
curred, nor did any exist; Berkshire did not vote on the merger and
an independent board at Scott & Fetzer approved the compensation
package. The plaintiff sought to recover compensation in the form
of damages for the directors' breach of fiduciary duty in adversely
affecting the bidding process and the premium price that would
have been received for the stock had the merger not been struc-
tured to benefit the directors.
141
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claim on two
separate grounds, First, the defendants argued that the plaintiff was
merely asking for more money and was, therefore, barred by the
Ohio appraisal statute. Second, the defendants argued that the
plaintiff did not have standing to pursue a derivative claim. 42
The trihi court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's claims without a written decision.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the plaintiff was
not directly challenging the determination of fair value of the stock





141. Brief for Appellees at 7, 15, Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990).
142. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1073. The defendants argued that the plaintiff's second claim
was one that should have been pursued derivatively as a corporate claim. Therefore, by
the defendant's own admission, the claim did not deal only with misvaluation of shares in
the merger. Under Delaware law, the -second claim Would not have been subject to exclu-
sivity. See supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text (indicating that corporate claims are
not subject to exclusivity). It is apparent the defendant did not think the exclusivity of
appraisal would apply, and it therefore argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue
the claim. Brief for Appellants at 21, Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1072. For further discussion
of the standing issue, See infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text.
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and, therefore, that appraisal was not the plaintiff's sole reme-
dy.143 The court found that the plaintiff's fraud claims were suffi-
cient to withstand a motion to dismiss and also that the claims
were direct claims not subject to a loss of standing.' 44
The supreme court reversed again, holding that, because the
plaintiff sought to recover cash in excess of that provided by the
terms of the merger, his only remedy was an appraisal proceeding
to determine the fair value of his stock. 45 The plurality main-
tained that the plaintiff could allege his claims as separate causes
of action outside the appraisal proceeding provided that the claims
did not seek to change the fair value amount determined by the
proceeding, which the plurality seems to equate with asking for
cash beyond what the shares were worth as of the appraisal
date.' 46 The court's holding, however, eliminated the plaintiff's
ability to receive cash damages for harms resulting from the
directors' decisionmaking activity beyond the scope of the merger
process but nevertheless affecting the value of the stock.
B. Characterization of Claims
As illustrated in the previous examination of Delaware law, to
determine whether appraisal should be a shareholder's exclusive
remedy, it is necessary to determine the format of the claim and to
determine whether the challenged conduct resulted in a
misvaluation of the shareholder's stock. 147 Stepak's first claim al-
143. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1073. The court relied on Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co.,
513 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1987) (holding that appraisal is a shareholder's only remedy for
determining the value of his stock in a cash-out merger). The Armstrong court seemed to
recognize the Delaware distinctions regarding exclusivity of appraisal. It cited Rabkin v.
Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp., 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985) and Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) as support for allowing "additional cause[s] of action outside
the statutory guidelines[]," then stated that the issue narrowed to whether appraisal was
the exclusive means for determining the price of shares. Armstrong, 513 N.E.2d at 797-
98.
144. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
145. Id. at 1075.
146. Id.
147. For a discussion of the significance of the differences between corporate and direct
claims, see supra notes 120-32 and accompanying text. If the claim is direct, the
plaintiff's post-merger standing to pursue the claim is not subject to challenge. On the
other hand, if the claim is a corporate claim, it should not be subject to exclusivity of
the appraisal process, but it might be subject to termination due to the shareholder-
plaintiff's loss of standing. See infra notes 188-205 and accompanying text; see also
Adair v. Wozniak, 492 N.E.2d 426, 428 (Ohio 1986) (stating that "a court must prelimi-
narily determine if the pleadings state injury to the plaintiff upon an individual claim as
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leged that the lock-up option, 4' by foreclosing competitive bid-
ding for the Scott & Fetzer shares, was improper. Stepak alleged
that the lack of competitive bids effectively placed a cap on the
price he could receive for his shares. 149 Stepak claimed that by
adversely affecting the bidding process, the directors' conduct
amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty."t° This claim is similar
to the third example discussed earlier"'1 in which the issuance of
new shares could discourage bidding in the control share market,
even if adequate consideration was given for the shares. Stepak's
allegation illustrates conduct that harms share value by means other
than decreasing the value of firm's assets. Therefore, the claim
alleges damage to the Scott & Fetzer shareholders for which the
appropriate remedy is to grant relief directly to the shareholders
instead of indirectly through the corporation. In short, Stepak's
action constituted a direct claim. However, even though the claim
was direct, it should not have been subject to exclusivity because
the director misconduct Stepak alleged was not a misvaluation of
shares for purposes of determining the cash to be received in the
merger. In Delaware, because the claim did not challenge valuation
distinguished from an injury which indirectly affects the shareholders or affects them as a
whole"). Both the appellee and the appellant in Stepak recognized the significance of the
distinction between corporate and direct claims and addressed the nature of the claims in
their briefs. See Brief for Appellee at 15-17, Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072, (Ohio
1990) (No. 88-1940); Brief for Appellants at 19-27, Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072
(Ohio 1990) (No. 88-1940).
It is interesting to consider whether claims brought by shareholders of closely-held
corporations will now be subject to exclusivity in light of the court's decision in Crosby
v. Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989). Crosby held that claims of breach of fiduciary
duty in a close corporation which were previously pursued in the corporate claim format
may now be brought as direct claims. If Stepak held that corporate claims converted to
the direct claim format were subject to appraisal, then claims by shareholders of closely-
held corporations may now be subject to the same rule of appraisal, and those share-
holders may avoid the termination of standing.
148. See generally Note, Lock-up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1068 (1983) (discussing various state approaches toward lock-up options).
149. Brief for Appellee at 6, Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990) (No. 88-
1940). The appellants argued that the lock-up option was in fact a binding sale with a
flexible time of performance. Brief for Appellants at 7-8, Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d
1072 (Ohio 1990) (No. 88-1940). Cf Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 883-84 (Del.
1985) (finding that a press release revealing the purchase of one million shares by a
prospective acquirer and completion of financing for the merger "had the clear effect of
locking (the company's] [b]oard into the . . . [a]greement" and indicating that directors
cannot claim the bidding process has been kept open after they have granted a lock-up
option).
150. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
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by the directors, it would not be subject to exclusivity of appraisal.
In the alternative, if Scott & Fetzer had received inadequate
compensation for the option, Stepak should have pursued the claim
in the corporate claim format because the asset pool would have
been diminished. Allowing relief to return directly to the sharehold-
ers in such a case would circumvent the directors' discretion re-
garding the distribution of assets. Therefore, public policy requires
that relief return to the shareholder through the corporation. 52
This policy would not be implicated by director misvaluation of
shares at the date of appraisal because no corporate claim would
arise for director misvaluation of shares.'53 Therefore, even if the
claim were characterized as alleging inadequate consideration for
the option, it should not be subject to exclusivity according to Del-
aware principles. Delaware law clearly holds that no corporate
claims are subject to exclusivity, and thus, under either
classification, Stepak's first claim would escape exclusivity of
appraisal.
Stepak's second claim alleged that the compensation paid to
Scott & Fetzer executives was improper because the amount al-
legedly exceeded the value of services rendered to the corporation.
Stepak's second claim is similar to another example discussed
above"5 in which the alleged wrongful conduct was not that the
shares were misvalued at the appraisal date, but that the assets of
the firm were depleted prior to appraisal. When a firm's asset pool
is diminished, policy usually requires that relief return to the
corporation. 5 5 The Stepak court however, failed to recognize
depletion of corporate assets as a corporate claim and found ap-
praisal to be the exclusive remedy. 56 As a result, corporate
claims, which will always be based on conduct other than
misvaluation of shares, could be subject to exclusivity of the ap-
praisal process.
Stepak's final claim alleged that the shareholders did not re-
ceive their fair proportion of the value of the assets and business,
thus preventing them from obtaining a fair price for their
152. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21 and note 121.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 120-32.
154. See supra text accompanying note 62.
155. But see supra note 121 (providing examples of exceptions to this standard).
156. However, the plaintiff pleaded the claim as direct in order to avoid procedural
obstacles and termination of standing. Brief for Appellee, Stepak v. Schey, 553 N.E.2d
1072 (Ohio 1990) (No. 88-1940). Cf. supra note 147 (discussing the defendant's character-
ization of the plaintiff's second claim).
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stock."5 As a result, the plaintiff charged that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders.15  Unlike
Stepak's first two claims, this claim could be characterized as an
attack on the valuation of shares. By allegedly not giving share-
holders their fair proportion of the assets' value, the directors did
not take the steps necessary to properly value the shares. Because
the claim involved a misvaluation decision by the directors, it is
necessarily direct; a claim challenging valuation of shares is never
properly pursued in the corporate claim format. 59 In accordance
with Delaware case law, because Stepak's third claim was based on
misvaluation conduct by the directors and was not accompanied by
deception, conflict of interest or waste, it should have been subject
to exclusivity of appraisal.
C. Opinions of the Court
The plurality opinion by Justices Moyer, Sweeney and Resnick
did not limit exclusivity to cases based on an alleged misvaluation
of shares, nor did it recognize a distinction based on the format of
the claims. The court's holding ultimately failed to restrict exclu-
sivity to cases where appraisal is simply a substitution of forums.
Rather, the plurality held that Stepak's claims were merely issues
regarding the valuation of the stock."W The holding suggests that
regardless of whether other claims are involved, if valuation of the
stock is an issue, the claim is subject to exclusivity of appraisal.
In reaching its decision, the plurality relied on Rabkin v. Phil-
ip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.6' to state that "[s]uch valuation ques-
tions are the traditional subjects of an appraisal." t62 However, the
plurality misapplied Rabkin. In Rabkin, the court overturned a
decision to limit the plaintiffs' cause of action to appraisal and
found that the plaintiffs' claim did not involve valuation issues
which were traditional subjects of appraisal. 63 The court found
157. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1073.
158. The term fiduciary duty is usually used in this context to represent conflict of in-
terest claims. However, the Stepak court showed no appreciation of how the term fiducia-
ry duty is used. No conflict of interest was present in Stepak.
159. Cf. Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1146 (Del. 1989) (holding that
"the question of entitlement to a specific number of shares is alien to an appraisal action
under Delaware law').
160. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1073-75.
161. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
162. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1075 (citing Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1105).
163. Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1105.
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that although the plaintiffs' claim involved valuation issues, it was
also based upon the directors' conflict of interest. For this reason,
the Delaware court allowed the plaintiffs' to pursue their claim
outside appraisal." s It noted that "[t]here is no challenge to any
method of valuation" but rather a challenge to other
decisionmaking attributes, namely those which affected the value
arrived at by the directors.165 The Stepak plurality failed to recog-
nize the Rabkin court's distinction, and it clearly misread the deci-
sion.
Issues regarding cash entitlements can be divided into two
categories, those involving disputes over the valuation at the time
of exchange solely due to directors' decisions setting the terms of
the exchange and those that cause a diminution in the value of
shares because of some separate harmful conduct. Stepak's third
claim falls into the first category, for example, because it dealt
only with a misvaluation decision by the directors in determining
the proportion of the business the plaintiff was to receive. Con-
versely, Stepak's first and second claims are examples falling with-
in the second category because they alleged misconduct apart from
the valuation of the shares. In addition, all three examples given in
this note's discussion of exclusivity t" demonstrate share devalu-
ation that occurs prior to appraisal: excess compensation payments
to officers or directors, shares issued for inadequate consideration,
and the issuance of shares that discourage bidding in the control
share market which causes a reduction in share value. Each of
these claims fall within the second category.
The plurality's holding failed to recognize these distinctions
between Stepak's claims, resulting in a two-step process of extin-
guishing shareholder claims. The plurality held that if a cash award
is requested in the collateral judicial claim, no value-reducing mis-
conduct can be redressed in a judicial proceeding collateral to
appraisal. This rule applies even though the cash sought is not a
function of alleged misvaluation decisions by directors, but instead
is compensation for their separate misconduct in causing value, at
the time of valuation, to be lower than it would have been without
the separate misconduct.' 67 It also applies if the cash sought is a
164. Id. at 1107-08.
165. Id. at 1105.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 54-65.
167. For a discussion of whether Stepak's plurality or a coalition of Wright, Holmes,
Brown and Douglas might change if conflict of interest, deception, or waste were well
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function of misvaluation accompanied by conflict of interest. With
no way to handle the resolution of claims other than misvaluation,
or the relief implications of deception, conflict of interest or waste
in connection with misvaluation in an appraisal proceeding, extin-
guishment of these claims occurs. In short, the Stepak court does
not differentiate between possible causes of the components of a
cash relief request. Instead, it concludes that if cash is requested,
the plaintiff must base his claims upon a 'decision by directors to
misvalue shares (value them too low) in setting the terms of the
appraisal-triggering event.
Indeed, the plurality's language indicates that it did not care-
fully consider Stepak's first and second claims. The plurality stated
that it was considering "whether an action for breach of fiduciary
duty, essentially alleging that the board of directors ... failed to
obtain the highest possible price in a cash-out merger, may be
maintained outside the appraisal statute. At the core of plaintiff's
action ... is the allegation that the price ... paid . . . is
inadequate." 16  Such language ignores the true meaning of
Stepak's first two allegations. The effect of the holding is to ex-
tinguish the plaintiff's remedy in cases where some other types of
wrongful activity affected the price shareholders received for their
stock or where misvaluation was accompanied by deception, con-
flict of interest or waste.
Holmes and Wright, concurring in the syllabus and judgment
of the plurality, agreed that the plaintiff could not recover on the
claim as it stood."6 The concurrence stated that the plaintiff's
action sought more than a determination of fair cash value, but
because he had not previously sought to enjoin the merger or
shown unlawfulness, ultra vires acts, fraud or non-disclosure, he
was unable to recover.""0 The court's language may suggest a
recognition of the Rabkin exceptions to exclusivity regarding
misvaluation claims where deception, conflict of interest or waste
are involved. If true, had a conflict been present in this case, the
concurring justices, Holmes and Wright, and the dissenting justices,
Douglas and Brown might have formed a coalition sufficient to ap-
prove a remedy other than appraisal.
Holmes and Wright suggested certain remedies the plaintiff
pleaded, see infra text accompanying notes 169-76.
168. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1075 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 1078.
170. Id. at 1079.
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should pursue to succeed in an action for breach of fiduciary duty:
(1) disgorgement of profits resulting from the breach, (2) enjoining
the merger in conjunction with a claim for damages, or (3) rescis-
sion of the merger and/or damages in the case of unlawful, ultra
vires, or fraudulent acts by the directors or officers when accompa-
nied by nondisclosure of pertinent facts.'71 To suggest that the
plaintiff could obtain damages after pursuit of a claim at equity,
however, is contrary to the basic principles of the relationship
between law and equity. Claims of relief in equity are entertained
when no adequate remedy, such as damages, exists at law. There-
fore, to suggest that the plaintiff first bring an injunction to stop
the merger and then obtain damages reflects a lack of understand-
ing of the relationship between law and equity."
Dissenting Justices Brown and Douglas recognized the effect
of the plurality's holding when they noted that "[t]he majority
fail[ed] to perceive the distinction between a limited attack on the
failure to obtain fair cash value for shares and a charge of unfair
dealing which results in elimination of the highest and best pur-
chaser."1 3 They stated that appraisal does not provide a remedy
when the shareholders have been deprived of the best offer for
their shares. 74 They also stated that the majority had eliminated
the shareholders' remedy for their injury.175 Indeed, the dissent
rightly noted that in the case of a merger, "[i]f corporate manage-
ment engages in a bid-rigging scheme which deprives shareholders
of a premium over market price, a complaint cannot be made
without challenging the price paid for the stockOl," but that this
"does not automatically convert the action to a simple demand for
the 'fair cash value' of a stockholder's shares."'
176
171. Id. at 1078.
172. See Norberg v. Young's Market Co., Civ. Nos. 11,208, 11,253, 1989 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 174 (Dec. 19, 1989) (denying the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction
because the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not issued),
appeal denied, 571 A.2d 787 (1990); Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy Inc., 532 A.2d
1324 (Del. Ch. 1987) (sustaining plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction because
the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the merger were allowed); Scattergood v.
Perelman, No. 90-3451, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6482 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 1990) (denying
plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction due to a lack of showing of irreparable
harm), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 945 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1991) (appeal of denial of
injunction vacated as moot).
173. Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1080.
174. Id. at 1080.
175. Id.





Unlike the Ohio approach to exclusivity per Stepak, Delaware
has recognized the possibility of extinguishing shareholder's claims
by exclusivity of the appraisal proces 177 and has been conscious
not to allow such a result. For example, in Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett, 8 the court allowed a corporate opportunity claim, nor-
mally not addressable in appraisal, to be subject exclusively to
appraisal solely because of the unusual facts of the case.179 The
court recognized that appraisal does not provide an adequate forum
for corporate claims, but stated that "[i]n the present case a fair
value determination in an appraisal action will satisfactorily redress
the claimed wrongdoing." '
Conversely, in Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp.,"8'
the court found two separate reasons why the plaintiffs' claim
should not be subject to exclusivity of appraisal. First, the claim
involved misconduct other than valuing the shares, and second,
even if the conduct was misvaluation only, conflict of interest was
present, triggering another exception to exclusivity. The court stated
that the plaintiff could pursue his claim for breach of fiduciary
duty outside the appraisal process and address conduct other than
misvaluation, "[o]therwise we face the anomalous result that stock-
holders who are eliminated without appraisal rights can bring class
actions, while in other cases a squeezed-out minority is limited to
an appraisal .. . regardless of the degree of procedural unfairness
employed to take their shares." 182 Therefore, in developing the
basis for the conditions for exclusivity of appraisal, Delaware is
conscious not to apply exclusivity where the appraisal process
cannot provide a forum that can inquire into, or provide a remedy
for, the wrongfulness and impact of the decisionmaking being
177. Delaware law regards appraisal as a shareholder's exclusive remedy when a cash
freeze-out results and the only basis for a claim is that the directors (free of deception,
conflict of interest or waste), misvalued the shares that are to receive cash. See supra text
accompanying notes 66-133.
178. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
179. For a detailed discussion of the facts of the case, see supra notes 122-30 and
accompanying text.
180. Cavalier, 564 A.2d at 1143.
181. 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
182. Id. at 1108.
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challenged. Delaware is careful to make appraisal a "substitution"
for the preempted collateral judicial claim.
B. Requirements for Exclusivity Left Intact
The Stepak court has left few of the Delaware requirements
for exclusivity intact. First, Stepak does not require that the claim
alleged challenge misconduct other than valuation of the shares.
Stepak's first and second claims challenged nonmisvaluation con-
duct which, in Delaware, would have afforded him a forum collat-
eral to appraisal, but which the Ohio court held were still subject
to exclusivity.
Second, Stepak did not involve a conflict of interest. However,
the language of the plurality assumed the breach of fiduciary duty
alleged by the plaintiff.'83 If the Stepak court used the term
"breach of fiduciary duty" in the same manner as Delaware to
indicate conflict of interest, then they acknowledged the exception
to exclusivity in cases of conflict of interest, but chose not to
follow it. If true, it would appear that no exception exists in Ohio
for claims accompanied by conflict of interest. Alternatively, if the
court meant that a breach of fiduciary duty can exist without con-
flict of interest, then a larger exception was created. Only subse-
quent decisions will indicate which stance the court adopted.
The Stepak court did appear to follow Delaware by requiring
that appraisal apply only if the plaintiff seeks money damages.
Unlike Delaware though, Stepak did not distinguish between claims
for cash relief resulting merely from a misvaluation decision, and
cash relief requested to compensate plaintiff for nonmisvaluation
harm to share value. The language of the plurality suggests that if
relief other than damages were sought, the shareholder would be
able to pursue his claim outside the appraisal proceeding. The
plurality found that the plaintiff's request for relief from the al-
leged illegal lock-up option and inappropriate payments depleting
corporate assets was "merely asking for more money ... [and]
must be brought under the appraisal statute."'"
The failure of the court to disaggregate causes of harm reme-
died by monetary relief is clear error. Asking for cash to solve a
problem other than misvaluation or for deception, conflict of inter-
est or waste accompanying misvaluation is not an attempt to modi-
183. See Stepak, 553 N.E.2d at 1074.
184. Id. at 1075.
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fy the determination of fair cash value of shares as of the appraisal
date. The court, however, did not recognize this distinction. Ac-
cording to the plurality, "this is not to say that causes of action
which seek compensation other than the value of a dissenter's
shares of stock are not maintainable. Provable injury under whatev-
er theory asserted is compensable so long as it does not seek to
overturn or modify the fair cash value determined." i85 Such rea-
soning is flawed, however, because no attempt to get "compensa-
tion" for preappraisal wrongdoing would ever not be an attempt to
"modify" fair cash value. The court's language suggests that if the
plaintiff had sought relief other than damages, the plurality would
have found that he sufficiently stated a claim for relief.18 6 In ad-
dition, the language of the concurrence indicating the remedies
necessary to successfully pursue an action for breach of fiduciary
duty (disgorgement of profits, enjoining the merger prior to its
happening or rescission of the merger)' demonstrates that they,
too, would have joined Holmes and Wright if nondamage relief
were sought. Therefore, it appears that if the plaintiff had not
sought damages, but instead sought to enjoin the merger, possibly
the whole court would have afforded the plaintiff relief.
Since Ohio, unlike Delaware, does not require that only direct
claims be subject to exclusivity, nor that the claim limited to the
appraisal remedy challenge misconduct only in valuing the shares,
corporate claims may now be subject to exclusivity. Also, the
court's decision is unclear as to whether an exception to exclusivity
based on conflict of interest exists in Ohio; the plurality did not
address the presence of a conflict of interest in Stepak or indicate
what affect the existence of a Conflict of interest may have had on
their decision. However, the requirements that the dissent-triggering
event be, at least in part, a cash-out proposal and that the claim be
for monetary relief still appear common to both jurisdictions.
C. The Relevance of Extinguishing Corporate Claims
Despite the possible extinguishment of corporate claims, it
could be argued that, because a court may terminate a claim due to
a lack of standing, no severe elimination of rights occurs. This
185. Id. at 1074 (citing Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 798 (1987),
cert. denied, I11 S. Ct. 1076 (1991)).
186. See also supra text accompanying notes 167-71.
187. See also supra text accompanying note 171.
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contention is incorrect for several reasons.
First, jurisdictions differ as to when the loss of standing oc-
curs.'88 For example, in Delaware, "a derivative shareholder must
not only be a stockholder at the time of the alleged wrong and at
time of commencement of suit but ... he must also maintain
shareholder status throughout the litigation."' 89 Two exceptions to
this general rule exist: "(1) where the merger itself is the subject
of a claim of fraud; and (2) where the merger is in reality a reor-
ganization which does not affect plaintiff's ownership of the busi-
ness enterprise."'9't Ohio also requires that the plaintiff be a
shareholder at the time of the transaction complained of, that the
plaintiff adequately represent the interests of the other shareholders
and that the suit not be dismissed without the approval of the
court.' 9' In contrast, California law allows subsequent purchasers
of stock to pursue derivative claims in limited circumstances: (1) if
there is a strong prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff pursuing
the claim; (2) no similar claim has been or is likely to be pursued;
(3) the plaintiff acquired the shares before disclosure of the wrong-
doing; (4) without pursuit of the claim, the defendant will retain a
benefit from his misconduct and (5) relief will not result in unjust
enrichment to the corporation or its shareholders." 2 Because
standing requirements differ from state to state, many corporate
claims will escape standing cut-off. Therefore, extinguishment of
corporate claims by the exclusivity of the appraisal process is a
significant elimination of shareholders' rights.
Second, occasionally claims that were initially corporate will
become redressable in the direct claim format because the policy
compelling the use of the corporate format is no longer present.
For example, in Crosby v. Beam,'93 the plaintiffs alleged that the
188. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, §§ 5942-43 (setting forth the relevant statute or rule
for each of the fifty states); see generally MBCA Ann. § 7.40 (describing various issues
surrounding the procedural requirements of maintaining derivative suits).
189. Lewis v. Aronson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984) (citing Heit v. Tenneco, Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 884 (D. Del. 1970); Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A.2d 17 (Del. Ch. 1982);
Harff v. KerKorian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del. Ch. 1974); Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 199 A.2d
760 (Del. Ch. 1964)).
190. Id. at 1046 n.10.
191. OHIO R. CIV. P. 23.1.
192. CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b) (West 1990).
193. 548 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 1989). Oregon has also recognized that a corporate claim
can "convert- to a direct action under certain conditions. See Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d
235, 236 (9th Cir. 1956). The Watson court held that where the rights of creditors and
other shareholders were not prejudiced, a claim normally pursued in the corporate format
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defendants "improperly expended corporate funds" t"' of the Sea-
scape Building Company, a closely-held corporation. The plaintiffs
were minority shareholders of Seascape and the defendants were its
controlling shareholders, officers and directors.'95 Seascape was
voluntarily dissolved and the corporate assets transferred to a trust.
It was from this transaction that the plaintiffs' claims arose.'"
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims could only be pur-
sued as a derivative action and that the plaintiffs did not have
standing to pursue a derivative claim. 97
The court held that the plaintiff could pursue the claims indi-
vidually.'98 It focused on the heightened fiduciary duty between
majority and minority shareholders in a closely-held corporation,
analogizing the duty to that required in a partnership.' The
court noted that "a derivative remedy is not an effective remedy
because the wrongdoers would be the principal beneficiaries of the
recovery."" Additionally, Seascape had no creditors, therefore
rendering moot the policy concerns regarding protection of
creditors' rights.20' Moreover, because the corporation was dis-
solved and termination payments made, no corporation existed to
receive an award.
In addition, it cannot be argued that corporate claims will
always be pursued by the successor corporation, as there may be
no incentive for the successor to pursue the claims. If a purchaser
has been given a discount on the purchase price paid to
shareholders for giving up the right to receive claims from the
seller, the purchaser would not be inclined to pursue such claims.
For example, in Stepak v. Schey,0 2 Berkshire had no incentive to
pursue the action brought by Stepak because it extracted a benefit
could be pursued individually by a shareholder. Id Not to permit such a suit -would
allow a director to misappropriate funds and leave those injured without a remedy." lI
194. Id. at 218.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. The defendants argued that the first plaintiff, Crosby, could not pursue the
claim because he had transferred his shares to the second plaintiff, Church, before the
action began, and that Church could not bring claims based on misconduct that had oc-
curred before his acquisition of the stock. Id.
198. Id. at 221.
199. Id. at 220.
200. Id. at 221.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 120-32 (discussing the policy considerations
behind corporate and direct claims).
202. 553 N.E.2d 1072 (Ohio 1990).
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from Scott & Fetzer in exchange for allowing Scott & Fetzer man-
agement to take the allegedly excessive compensation paid to
them.2 3 As a result, Berkshire could be perceived as aiding and
abetting the conduct underlying the claims and would not pursue a
claim in which it would be exposed as a wrongdoer.214 There-
fore, the claim would convert to a direct claim because only the
shareholders would pursue a claim against the directors.
Finally, redress to the successor often would not benefit those
who suffered the reduction in value resulting from nonmisvaluation
conduct. For example, a party in Berkshire's position should not
succeed to the corporation's claims if it paid a lower price to
shareholders as a result of the wrongful compensation withdrawals
benefitting the corporation's directors. Recovery would, under that
assumption, be a windfall to the successor.2°5 Recovery by the
successor would not make whole the shareholders who had realized
their losses in the "sale" of their shares to it.
The argument that no severe elimination of rights occurs with
respect to corporate claims that may be subject to a loss of stand-
ing weakens when applied to the situations outlined above. There-
fore, when arguing that no severe elimination of rights has oc-
curred, it is important to note that jurisdictions differ as to when
loss of standing occurs and what appears to be a corporate claim
could "convert" to a direct claim in light of termination of the
firm.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Ohio Supreme Court's failure to distinguish
among claims based on whether the underlying allegations (1)
relate only to misvaluation at the appraisal date, (2) relate to
misvaluation but are accompanied by deception, conflict of interest
or waste, or (3) relate to misconduct that diminished share value
203. Id. at 1073.
204. Cf, Porter v. Texas Commerce Bancshares, Civ. No. 9114, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS
130 (Oct. 12, 1989). In Porter, the plaintiffs alleged that the value paid for their shares
by the purchaser was less than the shares were worth because claims owned by the com-
pany against the directors were not reflected in the price paid. Id. at *8. The court found
that the transaction was negotiated at arm's-length and that the shareholder, in such a
case, is not entitled to a price that is "fair" or 'adequate." Id. at *14.
205. See Bangor Punta Operations v. Bangor & A.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 710 (1974)
(recognizing a "settled principle of equity that a shareholder may not complain of acts of
corporate mismanagement if he acquired his shares from those who participated or acqui-
esced in the allegedly wrongful transactions").
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other than by misvaluing shares, extinguishment of claims that fall
into the latter categories can occur by exclusivity of the appraisal
remedy. Without a remedy for these claims, harms are left unre-
dressed. Furthermore, corporations may seize the opportunity to use
appraisal-triggering transactions to rid themselves of
nonmisvaluation dissenters' claims, when the plaintiff requests cash
relief, through the two-step process of extinguishment. 6 Apprais-
al-triggering transactions then become a shield, offering directors
and officers protection from liability for misconduct. Courts should
not permit directors and officers to escape liability for misconduct
in this manner, but instead should carefully distinguish between the
categories of claims and not allow requests for cash relief to color
the nature of the claim. Surely our courts are able to recognize the
distinctions outlined in this note and not apply exclusivity where
appraisal cannot provide an adequate remedy for the misconduct
being challenged.
Michelle M. Pepin*
206. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
*The author wishes to thank Professor Ronald J. Coffey of the Case
Western Reserve University School of Law for his help and advice
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